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Ina recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome,
but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilib-
rium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest
error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome
of a mixed equilibrium. We compare the predictions in various classes of
evolutionary and learning processes in this game. Only the continuous best
response dynamic uniquely selects the Stackelberg outcome under noise. All
other dynamics analyzed allow for the Cournot equilibrium to be selected.
In typical cases Cournot is the unique long run outcome even for vanishing
noise in the signal.
JEL￿ classi￿cation numbers: C72, C73.
Key words: imperfectly observable commitment, evolution, imitation, learn-
ing, equilibrium selection.1 Introduction
In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that a ￿￿rst mover advantage￿
in games depends crucially on the fact that the action taken by the ￿rst
mover is perfectly observable. In fact, he showed that if the action is ob-
served with the slightest bit of error, no commitment is achieved.1 Bagwell
used the example of Stackelberg competition in which the leader can either
choose the quantity (L) of a Stackelberg leader or the Cournot quantity
(C). He shows that if the quantity choice is observed with some error (i.e.
if there is a small probability that the follower observes C when the leader,
in fact, chose L), then the only equilibrium in pure strategies is the Cournot
equilibrium.2
As noted by Bagwell (1995) there are ￿ additionally to the Cournot
equilibrium ￿ two mixed equilibria, one of which is ￿close￿ to the Stack-
elberg outcome in the sense that it converges to the Stackelberg outcome
as the noise vanishes. By using a modi￿cation of Harsanyi and Selten￿s
(1988) equilibrium selection theory Van Damme and Hurkens (1994) argue
that this ￿noisy Stackelberg equilibrium￿ should be selected. However, the
Cournot equilibrium is a strict equilibrium and therefore has many desirable
properties.
Given the controversy over which equilibrium should be selected the pur-
pose of this paper is to compare the predictions made by three classes of
evolutionary dynamics for this game. First, we consider a general class of
smooth continuous time dynamics that include payo⁄ monotone and payo⁄
positive but not best response dynamics. Through the introduction of noise
the Cournot equilibrium becomes asymptotically stable. On ￿rst sight this
might not be surprising as the Cournot equilibrium is the unique strict equi-
librium in the game with noise. However, the payo⁄ di⁄erence to the second
best strategy vanishes as the noise goes to zero. Nevertheless, the basin of
1Adolph (1996) shows that commitment is restored if additionally to the noise in signal
transition players make mistakes in the execution of their strategies.
2This results has been generalized in several directions, see Van Damme and Hurkens
(1994) and G￿th, Kirchsteiger and Ritzberger (1995).
1attraction of the Cournot equilibrium stays large when noise becomes small.
Whether or not the Stackelberg equilibrium has similar properties depends
on the speci￿cations of the dynamic, under the standard replicator dynamic
it does not.
Next, we consider general ￿nite population dynamics. Here, Cournot is
selected if the population is large enough. For small populations the method
is inconclusive. Finally, we consider the continuous best response dynamic.
This dynamic is the only one which selects unambiguously the Stackelberg
outcome, with or without noise.
Thus, we ￿nd at least partial support for Bagwell￿s result. The Cournot
equilibrium should not be ignored as a prediction under noise, often it is
even the unique prediction. Only the strong and somewhat unrealistic in-
formational assumptions underlying the best response dynamic in in￿nite
populations preserve the Stackelberg prediction.
2 Bagwell￿s example
Consider the game in extensive form shown in Figure 1.3
Now suppose as in Bagwell￿s (1995) paper that player II can observe
player I￿s choice only with some error. To be precise, we assume that with
probability 1 ¡ " player II observes the action of player I correctly. With
probability "<1 = 2he receives the wrong signal. This game of imperfect
information yields the following normal form ¡.
FF FC CF CC
L 2;1 2 ¡ 2";1¡" 2";" 0;0
C 3;0 1+2 ";1¡" 3¡2";" 1;1
3The payo⁄s of this game do not match exactly those of Bagwell (1995). In particular,
in the usual duopoly setting player II would receive a higher payo⁄ from F when I plays
C rather than L. We can simplify this without loss of generality since all that matters is




F C F C
(2,1)  (0,0) (3,0) (1,1)
II
Figure 1:
Player II, the column player, has four pure strategies. E.g. FC stands
for II￿s strategy of playing F in response to signal L and C in response
to signal C. Let Si denote player i￿s set of pure strategies and ¢(Si) its
mixed extension. Elements of ¢(Si) are denoted by p and q with ei =
(0;0;:::;1;0:::0) being the special case of a pure strategy. We will frequently
write A (B) for the payo⁄ matrix of player I (II).
It is immediate that the Stackelberg strategies (L;FC), which are the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the game of perfect information, are
not an equilibrium in the game with noisy signals. The unique equilibrium
in pure strategies is the Cournot equilibrium (C;CC). Note, that this equi-
librium is strict. In addition, there are two mixed equilibria,












(^ p; ^ q): =
‰










We call (~ p; ~ q) the ￿noisy Stackelberg equilibrium￿ since it converges to the
Stackelberg outcome as " ! 0.
33 Evolutionary dynamics
Evolutionary dynamics are a useful technique for testing the stability of a
given Nash equilibrium. In the following this analysis will be undertaken
using three di⁄erent approaches.
3.1 Weakly payo⁄ monotone dynamics
In this section we consider an in￿nite population in which individuals are
continuously updating their actions. We search for states that are robust
against rare mutations. Formally, we characterize asymptotically stable
states. However, even if a state is asymptotically stable, we would consider
it less plausible if its basin of attraction vanishes for " ! 0.
Changes in the population proportions are assumed to follow a selection
dynamic (as de￿ned by Samuelson and Zhang, 1992). This is a continuous
time dynamic on ¢(S 1)£¢(S 2)
_ p i = f i(p;q);i2S 1
_ q j = g j(p;q);j2S 2
with





e j2 S 2g j( p;q)=0 ;and
3. pi =0implies fi (p;q) ‚ 0;q j=0implies gj (p;q) ‚ 0 for any i 2 S1
and j 2 S2:
The ￿rst condition guarantees that there is a unique solution. Moreover,
it puts a bound on how much the gradient may change when the state (p;q)
changes slightly. The other two conditions ensure that the dynamic stays
in ¢(S 1)£¢(S 2): Notice that the best response dynamic (Section 3.3)
4Fi is Lipschitz continuous if there exists mFi > 0 such that Fi (p;q) ¡ Fi (p0;q0) •





4does not ￿t in this class since the gradient may change abruptly when there
are small changes in the state (Lipschitz continuity fails). However, any
dynamic that is based on individuals reacting to ￿nite samples will belong
to this class.
De￿nition 1 We call a selection dynamic weakly payo⁄ monotone in a
given game if the following four conditions hold:
1. limpk!0
fk(p;q)
pk exists in R[f§1g








4. The above properties also apply to _ qj and
_ qj
qj in their appropriate
formulation.
We allow for in￿nite growth rates, which makes a scenario feasible where
some individuals have enough knowledge of the game to stop playing some
of their strategies (e.g., because they are strictly dominated). Instead of
putting restrictions on growth rates of each strategy, we demand in condi-
tions (2) and (3) that the growth rate of a best/worst response to the present
state increases/decreases strictly if not all actions present achieve the same
expected payo⁄.
The above de￿nition generalizes several commonly used evolutionary dy-
namics. In particular, it covers the classes of payo⁄ monotone (also known as
compatible) and payo⁄ positive dynamics (see Weibull, 1995, Chapt. 5, for
de￿nitions). Payo⁄ monotonicity requires that growth rates of strategies are
ranked according to their payo⁄. Payo⁄ positivity requires that strategies
earning above (below) average have positive (negative) growth rates.
In the following we present two examples of weakly payo⁄ monotone
dynamics (they are in fact aggregate monotone according to Samuelson and
5Zhang, 1992). The standard continuous replicator dynamic (Taylor, 1979)
for a bimatrix game with payo⁄ matrices (A;B) is de￿ned as
_ pi = pi(eiAq ¡ pAq)
_ qj = qj(pBej ¡pBq):
Many individual learning models are approximated by this dynamic (e.g.,
Gale et al., 1995; Schlag, 1996).
A slightly modi￿ed version used mostly in biological applications, called
the adjusted continuous replicator dynamic (Maynard Smith, 1982) is given
by








A state is called (Lyapunov) stable if trajectories starting su¢ciently
close stay arbitrarily close. A state is called attracting if there exists a
neighborhood of this state such that trajectories starting in this neighbor-
hood eventually converge to the state. The basin of attraction of an at-
tracting state is the set of all states such that trajectories starting in such
a state lead to the attracting state. Asymptotic stability means both stable
and attracting. Sometimes the concept of asymptotic stability is too strin-
gent and we need the following weaker concept. A closed set of rest points
is called interior asymptotically stable if trajectories starting in the interior
su¢ciently close to the set stay arbitrarily close to the set and eventually
converge to the set. This concept generalizes asymptotic stability to sets of
rest points and additionally restricts attention to trajectories starting in the
interior.5
For the game ¡ without noise (" =0 )and the standard continuous
replicator dynamic Cressman and Schlag (1996) show that (1) the Stack-
elberg equilibrium is contained in the unique interior asymptotically stable






, which is the set of Nash equilib-
ria that yield the Stackelberg outcome, and (2) the Cournot equilibrium is
(Lyapunov) stable but not asymptotically stable. The following proposition
generalizes this result to our class of weakly payo⁄ monotone dynamics.
Proposition 1 For any weakly payo⁄ monotone dynamic, when informa-
tion is perfect (i.e., there is no noise) then the Cournot equilibrium is stable
and the Stackelberg equilibrium is contained in the unique interior asymp-
totically stable set.
Proof. Let G be an interior asymptotically stable set. FCis a weakly dom-
inant strategy for player II, hence _ qFC >0in any interior state. Continuity
of gFC implies that G must contain a state in which qFC =1 :Moreover,
since _ pL ‚ 0 holds when qFC is su¢ciently large, the Stackelberg equilibrium
(L;FC) must be contained in G.
By de￿nition, an interior asymptotically stable set is a closed set of rest
points. This set must be connected by the stability requirement. Conse-
quently, G ‰f ( e L;(1 ¡‚)eFC +‚eFF):0•‚•1 g:
If an element of G is not a Nash equilibrium then trajectories lead ini-
tially away from G (use the same trick as when proving ￿stability implies
Nash￿, see e.g., Weibull, 1995, Proposition 4.8). Consequently G is a set of
Nash equilibria. In the following we will show that G is equal to the Nash








If pL =1and qCC +qCF > 0; then _ qFF > 0 and _ qFC > 0 and hence
_ qCC+_ q CF <0. Consider ¿>0but su¢ciently small such that _ qCC+_ q CF •0
when pC < 3¿: Since FC is a weakly dominant strategy for player II, conti-
nuity implies there exists „>0such that ¿<p L<1 ¡ ¿implies _ qFC >„ :If
qFF =q FC = 1
2 then eLAq = eCAq and continuity of fL (p;¢) implies _ pL =0 :
Consequently, there exists 0 <”<¿such that _ pL > ¡„ and hence _ pL +
_ qFC >0when pL >¿and 1
2¡”<q FC < 1
2+”: Let ﬁ>0be such that _ pL > 0
7when qFC > 1
2+”and qCC+qCF <ﬁ . Consequently, trajectories starting in
'
(p;q):q FC > 1




in this set. Moreover, _ qFC ‚0implies that trajectories converge to G: Since
¿ was arbitrary as long as it was su¢ciently small it follows that G is an
interior asymptotically stable set.
Consider now the Cournot equilibrium (eC;e CC). eLAeCC <e CAeCC
together with (3) implies limpL!0
fL(p;eCC)
pL < 0. Continuity implies there
exists N>0such that _ pL •¡ NpL in a neighborhood U of (eC;e CC).
eCBeCC ‚ eCBej for all j implies _ qCC =0 :Lipschitz continuity implies
there exists M>0such that _ qCC ‚¡ MpL in a neighborhood U0 ‰ U of
(eC;e CC). W.l.o.g. let U0 = f(p;q):MpC +NqCC >ﬂ gfor some 0 <ﬂ<
M+Nchosen su¢ciently large. Consequently, M _ pC + N _ qCC = ¡M _ pL +
N _ qCC ‚ 0 in U0 which implies that MpC + NqCC is a local Lyapunov
function, trajectories starting in U0 stay in U0 and hence (eC;eCC) is stable.
Notice that we did not need Lipschitz continuity to prove the stability
of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Now we will investigate dynamic stability for constant noise and as noise
varies. Comparing dynamic stability under di⁄erent degrees of noise requires
that we specify how the dynamic changes as the underlying payo⁄s in the
game change (now A = A(") and B = B (")). Hence we must add some
conditions on the dynamic, conditions that hold for all "<" 0for some
"0 > 0:
1. fi and gj are Lipschitz continuous with constants mfi and mgj inde-
pendent of ";
2. (monotonicity) Consider a small change in ": Then fi (p;q) weakly
increases if eiA(")ek weakly increases and erA(")ek weakly decreases
for all r 6= i and all k. Similarly, gj (p;q) weakly increases if esB(")ej
weakly increases and esB(")ev weakly decreases for all v 6= j and all
s.
8Notice that _ pi need not be continuous in the underlying payo⁄s as this
would be too strong a condition in many cases.6
When signals are received with noise the picture changes drastically. The
Cournot equilibrium can be selected by any generalized payo⁄ monotone
dynamic, whereas robustness of the Stackelberg equilibrium depends on the
exact speci￿cation of the dynamic. For the most common representative in
the class of payo⁄ monotone dynamics, the standard replicator dynamic, the
stability properties of the Stackelberg equilibrium are inferior to that of the
Cournot equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Consider the game with noise. For any generalized payo⁄
monotone dynamic the Cournot equilibrium (C;CC) is asymptotically stable.
Furthermore, the basin of attraction of (C;CC) does not vanish as " ! 0.
The only other candidate for an asymptotically stable state is the Stackelberg
equilibrium (~ p; ~ q);under the standard replicator dynamic (~ p; ~ q) is stable but
not asymptotically stable; under the adjusted replicator dynamic (~ p; ~ q) is
asymptotically stable.
Remark 1 Notice that we do not make any claim about interior asymp-
totically stable sets when there is noise. In this game all Nash equilibria
are singletons, hence an interior asymptotically stable set corresponds to an
asymptotically stable state (see arguments used in the proof of Proposition
1).
Proof. First we show that (C;CC) is asymptotically stable with non van-
ishing basin of attraction. Consider a slightly modi￿ed game ¡0 with the
same payo⁄ matrix as ¡ under " =0except that the payo⁄s of CF are eval-
uated at " = 1
4; i.e., eLAeCF = 1
2, eCAeCF = 5
2 and pBeCF = 1
4: Retracing
the steps in the proof of Proposition 1 it follows that there exists a neighbor-
hood U0 of (C;CC) where MpC +NqCC is a local Lyapunov function (i.e.,
6E.g., assume that player I has two actions 1 and 2; action 1 (2) yielding 0 (x)w i t h
certainty. Here it does not seem reasonable that a learning dynamic must be continuous
at x =0 :
9M _ pC +N _ qCC ‚0)i n¡ 0for appropriate constants M;N > 0: Comparing ¡0
to ¡(")with "<1
4we see that our monotonicity condition implies that both
_ pC and _ qCC increase. Consequently, MpC +NqCC is also a local Lyapunov
function in U0 for ¡ and any "<1
4:Especially, U0 was constructed such that
_ pC ‚ NpL which means that pC ! 1 as t !1 :For given " and su¢ciently
large pC it follows that _ qCC > 0 when 0 <q CC < 1 and hence trajectories
starting in U0 (which is independent of ") converge to (C;CC).
Each asymptotically stable state is a Nash equilibrium (a trivial gen-
eralization of Friedman, 1991 to our class of generalized payo⁄ monotone
dynamics). The best reply structure close to (^ p; ^ q) resembles that of a coor-
dination game where (^ p; ^ q) is the unstable interior mixed equilibrium. This
will make (^ p; ^ q) unstable. Consider G =
n




then (^ p; ^ q) is an accumulation point of G: Starting in G; C is the unique
best response for player I and CC is the unique best response for player II
which implies that _ pC > 0 and _ qCC >0. Especially trajectories starting in
G converge to (C;CC) which means that (^ p; ^ q) is not stable, especially it is
not asymptotically stable.
Consider now the Stackelberg equilibrium (~ p; ~ q) . The support of (~ p; ~ q)
is contained in ¢fL;Cg£¢fFF;FCg. On this face, ¡ resembles matching
pennies. Consider the standard continuous replicator dynamic. Trajecto-
ries cycle on this face (see, e.g. Weibull, 1995). Especially, this means that
(~ p; ~ q) is not asymptotically stable. However, restricting the dynamic to this
face (~ p; ~ q) is stable. Moreover, since BR(~ p; ~ q)=¢ f L;Cg£¢ f FF;FCg
it follows that (~ p; ~ q) is also stable in the entire space (this follows from
centre manifold theory, Wiggins, 1990, see Cressman and Schlag, 1996,
for an explanation of its application and for some examples). In the ad-
justed continuous replicator dynamic, (~ p; ~ q) is asymptotically stable on the
face ¢fL;Cg£¢f FF;FCg (see again Weibull, 1995). Now the fact that
BR(~ p; ~ q)=¢ f L;Cg£¢ f FF;FCgmakes (~ p; ~ q) asymptotically stable.
103.2 Discrete selection dynamics
A large part of the recent literature on evolution and learning assumes a
setting with discrete time and a ￿nite number N of players. Most dynamics
either are a version of a myopic best reply process (see e.g. Kandori, Mailath
and Rob, 1993, and Young, 1993) or some sort of imitation process (e.g.
Schlag, 1996). Here we consider a class of dynamics which is general enough
to encompass both kinds of dynamics.
The dynamics we consider result from the composition M(S) of a selec-
tion process S and a mutation process M. The discrete selection process
(which should not be confused with the continuous selection dynamics de-
￿ned in the previous section) is represented by a ￿nite Markov chain with
the following two properties. Most evolutionary processes are characterized
by an element of inertia. We model this by assuming that each period with
a ￿xed and independent probability ￿>0an individual must stick to his
old strategy. Furthermore, we assume that S is payo⁄ sensitive, a property
which is de￿ned next.
Let p and q denote the frequency distribution of strategies in population
one and two, respectively.
De￿nition 2 A discrete selection dynamic S is called payo⁄ sensitive if
(a) prob(pt+1
i >p t
i)>0)9 k6 =iwith pk > 0 and eiAq ‚ ekAq:
(b) If 9i with pi > 0 and eiAq ‚ ekAq; 8k with pk > 0 and strict inequality
for some k; then 9j with ejAq ‚ eiAq s.t. prob(pt+1
j >p t
j)>0 :
(c) Equivalent conditions hold for q:
Condition (a) states that the frequency of a strategy can only be in-
creased if there is another strategy present which performs weakly worse.
Condition (b) states that unless all current strategies perform equally, either
a currently best strategy or some other strategy, which does at least as well,
increases in frequency with positive probability. Condition (b) demands
11in particular that the process does not come to a halt unless all present
strategies perform equally.
The de￿nition allows for dynamics in which new superior strategies enter
the system (e.g. best responses) and for dynamics in which only strategies
can be chosen that are already represented in the population (as in imitation
processes). It covers weakly monotone dynamics (Samuelson, 1994), and
therefore best response and ￿Darwinian￿ dynamics (Kandori, Mailath and
Rob, 1993). But it also covers some imitation dynamics, in which strategies
which currently perform better in round￿robin matchings are imitated, e.g.,
the proportional imitation rule and ￿imitate if better￿ (Schlag, 1996).7
The mutation process M results from assuming that in each round, with
an independent probability `>0 , an agent randomizes uniformly over all
of his strategies. The process is therefore ergodic.8
In the game without error (" =0 ) the results with respect to the discrete
best response dynamics are inconclusive. Since neither of the pure equilibria
is strict, the results depend too much on the details of the dynamics to make
a general assessment.9
With noise the picture changes. (C;CC) is now a strict equilibrium and
the remaining equilibria are mixed. Stochastic dynamics do not in general
converge to mixed strategy equilibria in asymmetric games (see Oechssler,
1994, for some of the problems involved). Depending on the exact speci￿-
cation of the process a mixed equilibrium may even fail to be a restpoint of
the selection dynamics. Hence, it is not surprising that the discrete payo⁄
responsive dynamics select the strict equilibrium (C;CC) in ¡ if the popu-
lation size is large enough.10
7The latter interpretation requires that the population is large enough such that average
payo⁄s can be approximated by expected payo⁄s.
8For a good introduction to the graph￿theoretic methods used in this section see Vega￿
Redondo (1996). They were originally introduced by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984).
9E.g. it depends on whether players who already play a best reply may switch to other
strategies.
10Note, however, that the result is more ambiguous than that of the last section as for
a given population size there always exists an " small enough such that no result of this
12Proposition 3 Let " be given. If ">0and the population size N is larger
than 1=", then the limit distribution of the dynamic M(S) for ` ! 0 puts
probability one on the equilibrium (C;CC):
Proof. Note ￿rst that the support of the limit distribution of M(S) for
` ! 0 is a union of absorbing sets of S (see e.g. Samuelson, 1994, Theorem
1). A set of states Q is absorbing with respect to S if S cannot cause the
process to leave Q and any state in Q is reached within ￿nite time from any
other state.
Due to condition (b) of De￿nition 2 a singleton set can be absorbing only
if all strategies present in a population earn the same payo⁄. Candidates
for absorbing states are therefore all equilibria and all monomorphic states,
that is, states in which all players of a population use the same strategy.
Given the best reply structure of ¡; inertia and condition (b) imply that
from any non￿absorbing state there exists a sequence of transitions, each
occurring with positive probability, leading to some monomorphic state.
Hence, each absorbing set contains either an equilibrium or a monomorphic
state.
For N>1 =" it takes at least two mutations to leave the basin of attrac-
tion of (C;CC), that is, the set of states from which S returns to (C;CC)
with probability one. This follows because with only one mutation we have







































Hence, by condition (a) the process must return to (C;CC) after one muta-
tion.
Using the terminology of N￿ldeke and Samuelson (1993) the collection
of absorbing sets can be partitioned into (mutation connected) components.
kind can be obtained which holds for the entire class of payo⁄ sensitive dynamics.
13A component is called locally stable if it takes more than one mutation to
reach any other component. Given that it takes at least 2 mutations to leave
the basin of attraction of f(C;CC)g, this component is locally stable. We
claim that the remaining components are not locally stable as one mutation
is su¢cient to reach some other component.
Consider ￿rst the monomorphic states. If monomorphic states belong
to absorbing sets, then (C;FF), (C;FC), (L;FF), (L;FC) and (C;CF)
belong to the same component as they form a cycle in the sense of N￿ldeke
and Samuelson (1993). Starting in (C;CF) suppose there is one mutation
to CC. By condition (a) the process can move only to states in which pCC is
increased. Therefore, the process converges to (C;CC) and the component
is not locally stable: Likewise, (C;CC) can be reached from (L;CC); and
(C;CF) can be reached from (L;CF). Consequently, (C;CC) is the unique
monomorphic state contained in a locally stable component.
Next, consider (^ p; ^ q). One mutation to CC puts the process in the
basin of attraction of (C;CC): Finally, the best reply structure on the face
¢fFF;FCg£¢ f C;Lg are the same as in a Matching Pennies game. Due
to the inertia assumption, with positive probability the dynamics spiral out-
wards and reach the set f(p;q):p L<"and pFF +p FC =1 g:From there
by condition (a) CC will increase with positive probability. Hence, (C;CC)
can be reached from (~ p; ~ q) with one mutation. Consequently, f(C;CC)g is
the unique locally stable component.
By Proposition 1 of N￿ldeke and Samuelson (1993) a state can appear in
the support of the limit distribution only if it belongs to a locally stable com-
ponent. Since f(C;CC)g is the unique locally stable component and a limit
distribution exists, (C;CC) has probability one in the limit distribution.
The result in this proposition was obtained by considering ￿ for ￿xed
observational noise " ￿ the limit behavior of the dynamics when the proba-
bility of ￿mutations￿ ` vanishes. It is also interesting to consider the reverse
order of limits: What happens if we ￿rst let the probability of observational
errors " go to zero and then consider the dynamics as ` converges to zero?
14The answer is simple as for vanishing " the Stackelberg equilibrium is the
unique strict equilibrium for all ￿xed `>0and will therefore be selected
by the process. Which order of limits is more plausible depends on whether
one thinks that trembles in the execution of strategies or in their perception
are more likely to occur.11
3.3 Continuous best response dynamic
The continuous best response dynamic (Matsui, 1992, Hofbauer, 1995) is
de￿ned as
_ p = MBR(q)¡p
_ q = MBR(p)¡q
where MBR(x) is a (possibly discontinuous) selection from the (mixed)
best response correspondence to the pro￿le x. The interpretation is that at
any instant of time a small fraction of each (in￿nite) population is allowed
to adjust its strategy and chooses a best reply against the current pro￿le.
While each player chooses a pure strategy, mixtures are possible since dif-
ferent players may choose di⁄erent pure strategy best responses.12 Note
that players when adjusting their strategies are assumed to know the exact
distribution of strategies in the other population. This cannot be justi￿ed
if players sample only a ￿nite number of players. Thus, the informational
requirements underlying the continuous best response dynamic are quite
strong.
When signals are observed without error, FC is the unique best reply
for player II in any interior state. Given a su¢ciently large proportion of
player II individuals choosing FC, any player I individual will choose L.
Consequently, we have the following result.
Remark 2 Without noise, any trajectory starting in the interior will con-
verge to the Stackelberg outcome.
11See Adolph (1996) for a similar argument.
12See Hofbauer (1995) for the close relationship between the continuous best reply
process and ￿ctitious play.
15Next, we will show that this unambiguous prediction of the Stackelberg
outcome under the continuous best response dynamic will carry over to the
case of noisy signals.
Proposition 4 For 0 <"<1 = 2there are two asymptotically stable states,
(C;CC) and (~ p; ~ q). While the basin of attraction of (C;CC) vanishes as
" ! 0, the basin of (~ p; ~ q) converges to ¢(S1) £¢(S2).
Proof. (C;CC) is a strict equilibrium and hence asymptotically stable.
We will show that trajectories starting in
M (")=f ( p;q) 2 ¢(S1)£ ¢(S2) j p2 < minf1 ¡ ";1 ¡￿ +￿q2gg;
where ￿ :=
"(2¡4")
1¡4" , converge to (~ p; ~ q). This will complete the proof since for
" ! 0;M( " )converges to ¢(S1) £¢(S2):
Consider a state (p;q) 2 M("). Since p2 < 1¡", CC is not a best reply.
Note that CF is strictly dominated for all "<1 = 2and is therefore never a
best reply. Thus, for all (p;q) 2 M("), FC or FF are best replies for player
II.
We claim trajectories starting in M (") stay in M ("). Initial states in
which L is a best reply for player I are no problem since then _ p1 > 0 and
M(") cannot be left.
Consider next initial states (p;q) in which C is a best reply for player I,
which implies that




Suppose ￿rst that FC is a best reply for player II, i.e. p2 ‚ ". The best
response dynamics are always pointed in the direction of the best replies, in
this case, (C;FC): Thus, we have to show that
(1 ¡‚)(p;q)+‚ ( C;FC) 2 M(");
8‚< 1
2 ¡ 4 "
1 ¡ q 2(2¡4")
(1¡q2) , i.e. for all ‚ such that the convex combination remains
in the region where (C;FC) are best replies. In particular, it must hold that
(1 ¡‚)p2 +‚ • (1 ¡‚)(1 ¡ ￿ + ￿q2)+‚;
16which is satis￿ed by construction of M(").13
Finally, consider the case that FF is a best reply for player II at (p;q);
which implies that p2 • ": In this case _ p2 > 0 but as long as p2 • ", M(")
cannot be left, which proves the claim.
Since only FC or FF can be best replies for player II in M("), all tra-
jectories starting in M(") have limit points in the face H := ¢fL;Cg£
¢ f FC;FFg. Trajectories starting in H stay in H.O n H; ¡ is a rescaled
version of ￿matching pennies￿. By Theorem 7 in Hofbauer (1995) the contin-
uous best response dynamic on H converges to the unique Nash equilibrium
(~ p; ~ q) of this restricted game.
What remains to show is that trajectories approaching H behave like
trajectories starting on H. This can be done by de￿ning an appropriate
distance function of the trajectory on H to (~ p; ~ q) that decreases strictly over
time for trajectories on H. Consequently, this distance also decreases strictly
for trajectories that are su¢ciently close to H. This can be used to show
that trajectories starting in the interior converge to the noisy Stackelberg
equilibrium (~ p; ~ q):14
Finally, (^ p; ^ q) is not stable since there are arbitrarily close points to it
that belong to M ("), which means that there are trajectories that start
close to it and converge to (~ p; ~ q):
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